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LACAN AND CRITICAL MUSICOLOGY
In this paper an attempt is made to show
the significance, for critical musicology, of the
work of the psychoanalytical poststructuralist
thinker, Jacques Lacan. To that end LacanÕs reg-
isters of the imaginary and the symbolic are elu-
cidated, especially in so far as the former repre-
sents the sphere of the imaginary identification
and alienation of the subject as moi, ego or self,
and the latter, in turn, instantiates the sphere of
language, that is, of the subject as ÔIÕ or je. The
imaginary also represents the realm where the
subject, via primary misrecognition in the so-
called Ômirror phaseÕ, finds (spurious) unity and
wholeness in its ÔimageÕ Ñ something that sets
the pattern of all subsequent alienating identifi-
cations on its part. Lacan, it is argued, offers an
understanding of those possibilities, available
to the subject, of intermittent emancipation from
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Abstract Ñ Rsum
the potentially suffocating armour of the imagi-
nary, which may also be understood in ideologi-
cal terms. These possibilities involve both the
symbolic realm as well as the unconscious as a
Ôthird termÕ that not only destabilizes the sub-
ject as ego, but is also, as Ôdiscourse of the OtherÕ,
the locus of the subjectÕs ÔdesireÕ. Brief attention
is also given to the third of LacanÕs registers,
namely the ÔrealÕ, and to its significance in the
present context. To conclude, the potential fruit-
fulness of the Lacanian conception of the sub-
ject (as being precariously suspended among
these three registers) for the hermeneutic or ide-
ology-critical dimension of musicology is ex-
plored.
Key Words: Lacan; imaginary; symbolic;
ÔrealÕ; identification; alienation; discourse of
the Other; ideology-critique.
It seems to me that the poststructuralist, psychoanalytical theorist, Jacques
Lacan, offers critical musicologists valuable concepts for purposes of ideology-
critique. This struck me when I read Martina ViljoenÕs (2002) doctoral dissertation,
a study where she reconstructs, evaluates and negotiates a variety of recent theo-
ries regarding Ômusical meaningÕ, ultimately with the purpose of outlining her
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own, ÔinclusiveÕ, depth-hermeneutical, ideology-critical model of musical mean-
ing. In her dissertation Viljoen made excellent use of a variety of philosophical or
Ôcritical-theoreticalÕ models, including those provided by John Thompson, Ricoeur
and Johann Visagie (with some attention being paid to Derrida and Foucault), and
it occurred to me that musicologists in her position Ñ that is, working in a country
where there still seems to be considerable resistance to (critical-philosophical) theo-
rization in musicological circles Ñ might benefit from an acquaintance with LacanÕs
(or, for that matter, with another poststructuralist, Jean-Franois LyotardÕs) multi-
facetted intellectual heritage, difficult as it may be. But then, one should never
refrain from appropriating ÔdifficultÕ intellectual work Ñ as Derrida (1998: 43,
45-46) has remarked concerning Lacan, one ought to ÔloveÕ it for, among other
things, its difficulty, which resists the normalizing discourse of the easily accessi-
ble, even if Ñ as Andrea Hurst judiciously reminded me Ñ one should not ÔloveÕ
Lacan ÔunconditionallyÕ. In fact, as with any thinker who has left behind a formi-
dable and challenging oeuvre, the best manner of expressing oneÕs appreciation is
to engage critically (but responsibly) with it.
Lacan is an important thinker and discourse-theorist whose work could add
significantly to the richness and analytical efficacy of a project of critical musicol-
ogy. As I shall try to show, LacanÕs registers of the imaginary (which is related to
AlthusserÕs ÔimaginaryÕ as the sphere of the ideological) and the symbolic are pow-
erful resources for the understanding and unmasking of the covert functioning of
ideology. To mention but one thing: the overlapping of these spheres enables a
critical interpretation of the functioning of, among other things, popular music
video texts like the ones Viljoen has analysed (e.g. ÔWrapped upÕ; 2002b: 18-50)
regarding the mediation or construction of ÔpostmodernÕ identities, in so far as
LacanÕs imaginary pertains to the iconic or image-register, and the symbolic to the
lyrics of these music videos. Needless to say, an analysis would be likely to un-
cover tensions between the significations of these two registers Ñ something that
should become clearer in the course of this article. (Similarly, in LyotardÕs work
one encounters numerous concepts of potential relevance for the arts, including
music, and musicology understood as the ÔdisciplinedÕ attempt to understand music
as performance art. Among these one could pay particular attention to his concept
of figure or figurality; see OLIVIER 2003b.)
The imaginary in LacanÕs work is one of the three registers, or ÔordersÕ in terms
of which he theorizes the human subject, the other two being the symbolic and the
ÔrealÕ. The imaginary marks the sphere of images, which is also, for Lacan, the
sphere of identification which is basic to the development of the subjectÕs sense of
ÔselfÕ (Sheridan in LACAN 1981: 279). In ÔThe mirror stageÕ (1977b: 1-7),1  a short
1 A much lengthier treatment of the Ôtopic of the imaginaryÕ is given in LacanÕs first seminar (1991:
73-159). See in this regard also Benvenuto & Kennedy (1986: 47-62) for a lucid reconstruction and dis-
cussion of LacanÕs ÔThe mirror stageÕ.
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but seminal early text, he outlines the manner in which the subjectÕs perception of
its own mirror image, between the ages of 6 and 18 months, lays the foundation for
its constitution in the register of the imaginary, from which its further develop-
ment takes its course. This amounts to the following: the child, between 6 and 18
months of age, and still physically awkward and uncoordinated, perceives in her
or his own mirror image2  an apparently unified and whole Gestalt of itself in which
it ÔjubilantlyÕ revels. For Lacan such ÔrecognitionÕ of oneÕs image as ÔoneselfÕ is a
misrecognition; moreover, it is a fictional construct which Ñ and this is of crucial
importance Ñ lays the foundation for the further development of the subject along
a trajectory marked by identification and alienation. Why? In the first place, the
subjectÕs ÔmisrecognitionÕ of itself represents an ÔidentificationÕ in the sense of a
transformation in the subject on the assumption of an image Ñ an ÔI am thatÕ; or
better: ÔThat is me (moi)Õ. But secondly, it also inaugurates the subjectÕs (subse-
quently inescapable, albeit potentially mitigated) alienation. Before clarifying these
concepts, it is worthwhile scrutinizing LacanÕs text at this point (1977b: 2):
This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at the infans stage, still
sunk in his motor incapacity and nursling dependence, would seem to exhibit in an
exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial
form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before
language restores to it, in the universal, its function as subjectÉ.the important point is
that this form situates the agency of the ego, before its social determination, in a fic-
tional direction, which will always remain irreducible for the individual alone, or rather,
which will only rejoin the coming-into-beingÉof the subject asymptoticallyÉthis
GestaltÉsymbolizes the mental permanence of the I, at the same time as it prefigures
its alienating destinationÉ
Further on in the same text Lacan adds (1977b: 4):
The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to
anticipation Ñ and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial
identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-im-
age to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic Ñ and, lastly, to the assumption
of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the
subjectÕs entire mental development.
Here a quasi-digression is called for; one that concerns a certain correspond-
ence between this text of Lacan and one by Freud. In the latterÕs The interpretation of
dreams (1965: 179, 269-270, 637-650; see also SILVERMAN 1983: 66-76; OLIVIER
2 The ÔimageÕ in question need not be a literal image in a mirror or reflective surface Ñ it could
simply be a Ôself-imageÕ in the sense of Ôhow one imagines oneselfÕ as a result of someoneÕs verbal
appraisal of oneÕs appearance, for instance. This should become clearer in the course of this essay.
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2000: 167-173) he distinguished between two kinds of semiotic processes (that is,
processes that produce meaning), namely, the primary process of the unconscious,
which functions by means of images, and the secondary process of the preconscious
and conscious, which operates in terms of thought, language and purposive motor move-
ment. In FreudÕs early theory of the mind both of these processes served the pleas-
ure principle in so far as each, in its own way, served to remove psychic tension or
excitation in order to restore a state of homeostasis or psychic equilibrium. The
correspondence between Freud and Lacan becomes apparent where Freud sug-
gests that the manner in which the primary process satisfies the demands of the
pleasure principle is hallucinatory (for example in dreams, when delectable images
of sumptuous meals tantalize and apparently, i.e. hallucinatorily, satisfy the dream-
erÕs hunger), while that of the secondary process proceeds in accordance with the
Ôreality principleÕ Ñ that is, the processes of thought, language and motor move-
ment aim at resolving tension (e.g. that caused by hunger) by means of ÔrealÕ solu-
tions (such as finding and eating food). IsnÕt it striking that what, for Freud, is the
ÔhallucinatoryÕ Ñ that is, not ÔrealÕ, but imaginary Ñ function of images, resonates
with LacanÕs claim that the image with which the child identifies, and which forms
the basis of all further identifications throughout the subjectÕs life, is fictional? To be
sure, Lacan adds the important insight into the function that the mirror-image serves
for the subject, namely to impart to him or her a (spurious, but indispensable) sense
of unity and wholeness Ñ one that tends ultimately to be alienating, were it not for
languageÕs countervailing function to free one as subject from the Ôrigid armourÕ of
what might otherwise be the suffocating effect of imaginary identification.
This explains LacanÕs remark concerning language ÔrestoringÕ to the ÔIÕ its Ôfunc-
tion as subject in the universalÕ. But why should it be the case that the subject only
attains ÔfullÕ subjectivity by means of the ÔuniversalÕ aspect of language Ñ doesnÕt
that clash with his contention (LACAN 1977b: 1, 6), that grasping the fictionalising
aspect of the mirror stage, which lays the basis for the subject eventually acquiring
language, teaches one to oppose any universalistic philosophy based on the Cogito,
that is, any philosophy which claims actual unity and transparency for the subject?
The point is that such a claim would itself be a product of imaginary misrecognition
or delusion. It is precisely the signifying function of language or the symbolic
order which enables the subject to be a subject, that is, to surpass the muteness
and inertia of the ÔrealÕ Ñ for instance the body in its pure (ÔunintelligibleÕ,
ÔunsymbolizableÕ) organic state3  Ñ but also, significantly, to symbolize itself in
language as someone with a personal, open-ended narrative in time and space.
3 It should be kept in mind, though, that it is language, through which the subject becomes a
subject, which simultaneously robs the individual of her or his inexpressible uniqueness and power as
vested in the singular body. By entering the symbolic realm of language, the repository of societal laws
and values, the individual is ÔcastratedÕ in the sense of being ÔsubjectedÕ to it. This is what it means to be
a subject.
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This has to do with the structure of language as signifying medium, that is, as
comprising a system of signs, themselves exhibiting the dyadic structure of signifier
and signified, where the former may be any signifying unit, for example a spoken
or written word, and the latter (signified) the concept or conceptual meaning of
the signifier. What makes language, for Lacan, different from other kinds of Ôsym-
bolic objectsÕ, by way of a kind of ÔcompletionÕ, is precisely the functioning, in
language, of concepts. For the symbolic object to become the word, ÔÉthe differ-
ence resides not in its material quality as sound, but in its evanescent being in
which the symbol finds the permanence of the conceptÕ (LACAN 1977a: 65).4
 Such symbolization ÔpartlyÕ overcomes the constraints of the imaginary as
(taken by itself) the register of identification (and potentially of alienating impris-
onment), but because the imaginary overlaps the symbolic register (think of the
operation of metaphor or metonymy in language), such ÔliberationÕ is never com-
plete Ñ which is why Lacan states, in the passage quoted above, that the image is
the form that ÔÉsituates the agency of the ego, before its social determination, in a
fictional direction, which will always remain irreducible for the individual alone,
or rather, which will only rejoin the coming-into-beingÉof the subject asymptoti-
callyÕ. In other words, the subject as ego (or what Lacan terms the moi), which has
its provenance in the register of the imaginary as instantiated by the mirror phase,
and the subject as ÔIÕ (or what Lacan calls the je), which emerges in the register of
the symbolic (language), never coincide. No matter how hard one tries, the ego
will always approach the emergent subject ÔasymptoticallyÕ (and vice versa), that
is, the two aspects of the subject will always approximate each other without actu-
ally coinciding Ñ the ÔhealthyÕ subject is a ÔlackingÕ subject (while, in the case of
the psychotic, there is Ôlack of lackÕ).
We have here, I believe, an instance in Lacan of a genuine Ôquasi-transcenden-
talÕ, that is, of a mode of poststructuralist thinking that marks a development of
the tradition of (Kantian) transcendental philosophy. As is well-known, something
functions ÔtranscendentallyÕ when, like KantÕs categories of the understanding, it
is the condition of the possibility of something else Ñ in the case of the categories,
conceptual meaning regarding spatiotemporal phenomena. When something is
taken as performing a Ôquasi-transcendentalÕ function, however, an important shift
has taken place in (the understanding of) ÔtranscendentalÕ thinking: instead of
merely being the Ôcondition of the possibilityÕ of something else, it may then be
said to be simultaneously the Ôcondition of the possibility and the impossibilityÕ of
something else. So, for example, Jacques DerridaÕs (BENNINGTON 1993:276-277)
4 In a surprising manner, one rediscovers here the full implications of KantÕs (1952: 221-223) con-
tention that beauty is the symbol of the morally good. As such, it is the sensible appearance of what is
ÔsupersensibleÕ (albeit not exactly in KantÕs metaphysical sense): if beauty functions as a sensible sym-
bol of something else, it is a presence of an absence; similarly, if words as sensible signifiers constitute
the ÔsymbolicÕ order, they fleetingly instantiate what remains absent or ÔsupersensibleÕ, namely, the
entire system of signifieds or concepts (themselves, again, functioning as signifiers), which constitute
the system of language.
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notion of (the ÔprocessÕ of) diffrance is at one and the same time the condition of the
possibility and impossibility of meaning; which is a somewhat confusing way of
saying that it makes both meaning and non-meaning, sense and nonsense, possi-
ble. Similarly, the Ômirror phaseÕ (or mirror-image) in the life of every subject per-
forms a quasi-transcendental function: it is the very (ÔfictionalÕ, but indispensable)
condition for having a sense of ÔselfÕ or, in conjunction with the operation of lan-
guage once the subject has entered it, of a series of variations (ÔselvesÕ) on the intitial
Gestalt, but simultaneously also the condition for being alienated from this genuine
capacity of fictionalization or fantasy in so far as the subject tends to construct a
kind of (no less fictional) straitjacket or carapace to ÔcontainÕ or limit its generation
of images of the self. The order of the imaginary, in so far as it is inscribed or oper-
ates in language, may therefore deprive the subject of precisely what language of-
fers, namely the enduring possibility of revising and re-describing its own Ôiden-
tityÕ as ego, moi or self. Such a process of rearticulating oneÕs subject-position as moi
is never arbitrary, however, but occurs in so far as the uniqueness or irreducibility
of the subject at the level of the imaginary has to be negotiated in relation to the
inscription of the subject conceptually as je in the symbolic register. A considera-
tion of the structuralist background to LacanÕs thought may help to clarify this.
Commenting on the childÕs acquisition of language according to Lacan,
Jonathan Lee (1991: 20) says:
Here the moi becomes a je: the essentially individual identity constructed through the
childÕs image-constituted relations to others is transcended by a universal identity cre-
ated by and sustained within that broad range of cultural forces that goes by the name
of language. The imaginary product of a particular history of visual identifications
becomes a genuine human subject, able to use the first person pronoun and to identify
herself as the child of a particular family: ÔI am Joanna Smith.Õ
To be able to articulate oneÕs name in speech or parole means, in terms of struc-
turalist linguistics (one of the major sources of influence on Lacan), to be able to
draw on the (largely unconscious, assimilated) social value- and grammatical rule-
system labelled langue by Saussure. To the extent that langue embodies the Ôsocial
bondÕ Ñ something also implicit in FreudÕs concept of the Oedipus complex that
the child has to negotiate to find a place in the social order of kinship relations Ñ it
is therefore understandable that, prior to acquiring the use of language, one can
hardly be called a subject in the sense of being able to position oneself5  in the social
5 This ability to Ôposition oneselfÕ within the symbolic order may be understood in a structuralist
or in a poststructuralist manner, depending on whether one means by this that the subject Ôis (exclu-
sively) spokenÕ by language (structuralist), or that the subject is alternatively both Ôspoken byÕ, and
ÔspeaksÕ language or discourse (poststructuralist). In his later work, Lacan maintains a poststructuralist
position. See in this regard Olivier 2001 and 2003a, where I address this thorny issue (largely) in rela-
tion to the heuristic value of FoucaultÕs concept of discourse.
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and cultural world (represented by the symbolic order) through language in spo-
ken or written form. In an important sense, one Ôbecomes subject to the laws of
societyÕ by entering the symbolic order of language.6
The importance of LacanÕs claim, that the mirror-image marks the ÔfictionalÕ
provenance of the subjectÕs (alienating) ÔidentityÕ can nevertheless not be overesti-
mated. It explains his opposition to both traditional, Cartesian conceptions7  of the
subject as autonomous and self-transparent8, and Anglo-American ego-psychol-
ogy, which was predicated on the assumption that the ego or self was that ÔpartÕ of
the psyche responsible for establishing a healthy relationship with ÔrealityÕ. In fact,
as Lee (1990: 24) reminds one, Lacan here challenges FreudÕs own claims about the
ego as arising from the psycheÕs conscious ÔcontactÕ with reality Ñ if the ego or moi
is the result of ÔmisrecognizingÕ the mirror-image as oneÕs self, it is the product of
fantasy and as such is quite divorced from ÔrealityÕ.
 One of the most interesting and disconcerting implications of LacanÕs theory
of the ego or moi is that the structure of human knowledge is ÔparanoiacÕ (LACAN
1977b: 3). If one considers the etymological meaning of paranoia, namely (treating
something as if it is) Ôbeside, beyond mindÕ (that is, that it enjoys an independent
existence) as well as his remark, that in its Ômost general structureÕ human knowl-
edge9  endows Ôthe ego and its objects with attributes of permanence, identity, [and]
6 This goes a long way towards explaining LacanÕs (1977e: 234) dictum, that the unconscious is
structured like a language. For an insightful discussion of LacanÕs Ôturn toward structuralismÕ, see Lee
(1990: 34-38). This is not to say that Lacan remained attached to structuralist principles throughout his
intellectual career. Already in his work on the Ômirror stageÕ he displays distinct poststructuralist traits
as I show with reference to the Ôquasi-transcendentalÕ logic of the mirror-image. In his late(r) work this
poststructuralist bent becomes more conspicuous.
7 Small wonder that Lacan (1977: 166) modifies or reverses DescartesÕs famous ÔCogito ergo sumÕ
as follows: ÔI think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think.Õ Needless to say, this is a
reference to the unconscious.
8 This also manifests itself in LacanÕs attack on Sartrean existentialismÕs glorification of the sub-
jectÕs putative absolute freedom or autonomy, which Lacan (1977b: 6) regards as an illusion.
9 Interestingly, LacanÕs later theory of the Ôfour discoursesÕ (FINK 1995: 129-137; BRACHER 1994:
107-128) deviates somewhat from his early stance concerning (scientific) knowledge. Here he provides
a model with the aid of which one can traverse complex configurations of cultural practices, including
science, music and musicology. Succinctly put, he distinguishes among the discourses of Ôthe masterÕ,
of Ôthe universityÕ (or of ÔknowledgeÕ), of Ôthe hystericÕ and of Ôthe analystÕ, and Ñ contrary to what one
might expect Ñ shows that (authentic) science is an example, not of the Ôdiscourse of knowledge (the
university)Õ, but of that of Ôthe hystericÕ, given the manner in which hysterics constantly challenged
FreudÕs evolving theories by their behaviour. Similarly, true science is characterized by the repeated
challenging of every theoretical position that may be reached. Another way of putting this is to say
that, for Lacan, genuine science is marked by Ôstructural indeterminacyÕ, as exemplified by the princi-
ple of indeterminacy in quantum mechanics. Perhaps it is more accurate to say, then, that it is the
discourse of Ôthe hystericÕ and that of Ôthe analystÕ which, together, comprise the structural dynamic of
science, where the discourse of Ôthe analystÕ mediates between the destabilizing discourse of the hys-
teric and the hyper-stabilizing or rigidifying function of those of the ÔuniversityÕ and (hidden behind it)
of Ôthe masterÕ. It should be added that LacanÕs discourse-theory also enables one to understand his
model of the subject as being thoroughly poststructuralist (that is, as one that transcends the either/or
logic of traditional western thinking) in so far as the subject is theorized as occupying successive posi-
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substantialityÕ (1977d: 17), he seems to mean that there is a contrast, conflict, or at
least a tension, between the fluctuating field of human experience and humanityÕs
tendency to substantialize this Ôpunctuated flowÕ10  into things, entities or objects
marked by an independent and enduring being11  rather than by becoming. This
same tendency is responsible for the ÔalienatingÕ identification with various imagi-
nary constructs on the part of subjects. In this regard, for example, Kaja Silverman
(1992: 15-16) has referred to patriarchy (or patriarchal identification) in Lacanian
vein as Ôthe dominant fictionÕ. This means that adherence to an ideology Ñ whether
it is patriarchal, religious, political or economic, such as capitalism Ñ invariably
amounts to a kind of ÔparanoiacÕ identification with an image that promises (an
illusory) plenum or fullness to the ÔbelievingÕ subject. In so far as ideology func-
tions in music through musical motifs that invite listener-identification, this could
be demonstrated as well as critiqued in Lacanian terms.
An important implication of LacanÕs work on the ÔinscriptionÕ of human iden-
tity in the register of the ÔimaginaryÕ via ÔmisrecognitionÕ or identification with the
mirror image by the subject, is a denial of any adequate conceptualization of the
subject exclusively in terms of flux or becoming. The subjectÕs being is forever
caught in the tension-field between what Lacan (1977c: 298) calls the je (the ÔIÕ, the
subject of the saying or the enunciation) and the moi (the ÔmeÕ, self, ego or subject
of the statement, the ÔsaidÕ or the enunciated).12  While the latter or ego provides
the admittedly alienating, but nevertheless indispensable moment of relative or
intermittent stability, the former always, in the non-psychotic subject, transcends
the strictures and constraints of the ego or moi, so that one can speak, following
Joan Copjec (1996: xvi), of an Ôexcessive subjectÕ Ñ one that is never reducible to
tions within the discourse of the master, each of which is subverted by the subject intermittently posi-
tioning itself in the discourse of the hysteric. This enables the subject to maintain a condition of relative
stability coupled with a certain dynamism. This is made possible by the discourse of the analyst, which
mediates between the imaginary identifications of the subject in the register of the masterÕs discourse,
on the one hand, and the functioning of the discourse of the hysteric (which erodes these imaginary
identifications), on the other. Needless to say, of course, this applies to a ÕhealthyÕ (note the scare quotes!)
subject, as opposed to those subjects who Õget stuckÕ in a masterÕs discourse (e.g. patriarchy, religious
fanaticism, etc.), or, on the other hand, become the mere playthings of the unmitigated flux of the
hystericÕs discourse. In both cases, the subject would tend towards psychosis, which is recognizable by
its Õlack of lackÕ. In other words, the ÕlackingÕ subject is a ÕhealthyÕ subject.
10 This reminds one of SchopenhauerÕs (admittedly metaphysical) belief that what he called the
irrational Ôworld willÕ is best instantiated among all the arts by the fleeting forms of music as its imme-
diate embodiment, and that the human ability to ÔrepresentÕ reality in terms of concepts or (in the other
arts) as ideas, is essentially a falsification of this reality (OLIVIER 1998). Bergson, too, regarded ÔtrueÕ
reality or lan vital as something that eludes the human faculty of intellect with its tendency to
substantialize, and as being accessible only by intuition.
11 Not in the Heideggerian sense, which construes being in an ÔactiveÕ or processual sense. See
Heidegger 1978.
12 In this regard the formula, namely: subject = self or ego /(over) unconscious (as discourse of the
Other), may serve as shorthand for LacanÕs model of the human subject.
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any set of imaginary or, for that matter, historical indicators. For this to be possible
the registers of the symbolic, and ultimately of the ÔrealÕ, are indispensable.
In this regard one should note that in what has become known as ÔThe Rome
discourseÕ (see BENVENUTO & KENNEDY 1986: 77-90), or (more accurately) ÔThe
function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysisÕ (1977a) Lacan showed
that the psychoanalytic subject comes to grasp that, what had always been experi-
enced as his or her ÔdesireÕ, really belongs to an imaginary construct, the moi (as
theorized in ÔThe mirror stageÕ) (p. 42), and that his or her speech had therefore
been ÔemptyÕ Ñ in LeeÕs (1990:40) words, ÔÉit has been emptied of the subject by
being filled with his alienating moi identityÕ. Far from indulging the subject as
analysandÕs need for some measure of (spurious) security supposedly attainable
by strengthening the ego or moi, Lacan here pursues Ñ in the spirit of the Socratic
goal of bringing about a Ôwholesome unrestÕ in the soul of the philosophical inter-
locutor Ñ the cultivation of uncertainty on the subjectÕs part by ÔsuspendingÕ her or
his Ôcertainties until their last mirages have been consumedÕ (LACAN 1977a: 42).
If one wonders what he hopes to achieve along this trajectory of demolishing
the subjectÕs imaginary identifications at the level of (psychoanalytical) discourse,
the answer is firstly to be sought in the significance of the discontinuity or ÔgapÕ
between these identifications or the moi and the subject as je (from the Ôperspec-
tiveÕ of which any discourse ÔaboutÕ the moi is conducted), in so far as this gap
represents the function of repression (LEE 1990: 40-41). This would help explain
LacanÕs puzzling reversal of DescartesÕs paradigmatically ÔmodernÕ dictum, ÔCogito
ergo sumÕ (ÔI think, therefore I amÕ), namely ÔI think where I am not, therefore I am
where I do not thinkÕ, or Ñ in amplified form Ñ ÔI am not wherever I am the
plaything of my thought; I think of what I am where I do not think to thinkÕ (LACAN
1977: 166). The subject as je or ÔIÕ13  is located where it exceeds the domain of con-
scious deliberation and control, that is, at the level of the unconscious Ñ it is not
the same as the rational ego or moi of the Cartesian tradition, with its (illusory)
attributes of autonomy and self-transparency. It also clarifies LacanÕs (1981: 34)
contention that the status of the unconscious is ethical, which is another way of
saying that it is the locus of the subjectÕs desire in an ethical sense Ñ what we
ÔtrulyÕ want, is hidden from us via repression.14 But importantly, this also means
13 It should be noted, however, that Kant already recognized these various possibilities of Ôlocat-
ingÕ the subject. In his Critique of pure reason Kant (1964:236) remarks on what he calls the Ôsubject of
transcendental apperceptionÕ (which corresponds to LacanÕs je or ÔIÕ):
By this I, or He, or It, who or which thinks, nothing more is represented than a transcendental
subject of thought = X, which is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates,
and of which, apart from these, we cannot form the least conception.
14 fii¾ekÕs (1993: 206-208) discussion of the object a (or objet petit a) is helpful here in so far as he
adduces a very telling example from FreudÕs clinical practice of how the so-called object a functions as
the ÔknotÕ or concentrated point from the perspective of which oneÕs repressed, hidden desire becomes
apparent.
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that, in so far as it is ethical, it cannot simply be arbitrary Ñ it is subject to all those
social values which are embedded in the unconscious as the Ôdiscourse of the OtherÕ
(LACAN 1977a: 55).
Importantly, by highlighting the indispensable role of language as discourse
here, Lacan (1977a: 46) is suggesting a way of transforming the ÔemptyÕ speech of
the subject as moi into the ÔfullÕ speech of the Ôpsychoanalytically realized subjectÕ.
One cannot avoid noticing the irony, that ÔemptyÕ speech corresponds with the
(spurious) ÔfullnessÕ of the ego, while ÔfullÕ speech corresponds with the ÔlackÕ or
mercurial mobility of the subject as je or ÔIÕ. In other words, one has to achieve a
Ôsymbolic interpretationÕ of what occurs in the course of Ôfree associationÕ, a proc-
ess that enables the subject to reconstruct an Ôintelligible narrativeÕ or life story
(LEE 1990: 41-42). It is important here, to keep in mind that the ÔnarrativeÕ of the
analysand, as it emerges in the course of the dialogue between her or him and the
psychoanalyst (however minimal the latterÕs participation in it), is a product of
this dialogue, where the analystÕs art consists in timely (and well-timed) interven-
tions in the speech of the subject with the purpose of utilizing the gaps, hesitations,
signs of aggression, and so forth, to give the associative discourse a specific inter-
pretation, direction, punctuation or emphasis. And if one gets the impression that
there seems to be far too much ÔcoherenceÕ here (as one is inclined to, given LacanÕs
conception of the subject as ÔinterruptedÕ or ÔsplitÕ Ñ the so-called ÔbarredÕ subject
$) Ñ so much so that it bears a resemblance to the approach which Lacan explicitly
eschews, namely ego-psychology, his contention that there is a Ôthird termÕ (the
unconscious) at work in the analytical situation, quickly negates this impression
(LACAN 1977a: 49):
The unconscious is that part of the concrete discourse, in so far as it is transindividual,
that is not at the disposal of the subject in re-establishing the continuity of his con-
scious discourse.
According to Lacan (1977a: 50), the unconscious is that ÔchapterÕ of the sub-
jectÕs history which has been ÔcensoredÕ Ñ it is Ômarked by a blankÕ, but can be
ÔrediscoveredÕ through the interpretive ÔcooperationÕ between the analyst and the
free-associative discourse of the subject, despite resistance on her or his part. The
ÔlanguageÕ of the unconscious manifests itself in the subjectÕs bodily symptoms,
the memories of her or his childhood and in the very specific, ÔidiosyncraticÕ dic-
tion or verbal expressions he or she uses (LACAN 1977a: 50; LEE 1990: 44). This
makes the emergence of Ôfull speechÕ possible. It is along this trajectory that Lacan
arrives at one of his most startling insights, made possible by reading Freud through
(among others) the lenses of structural linguistics, that ÔÉthe unconscious is struc-
tured in the most radical way like a languageÉÕ (LACAN 1977e: 234; LEE 1990: 46).
This seems more intelligible if one reflects on his assertion that the subjectÕs un-
conscious ÔÉis the discourse of the otherÉÕ (LACAN 1977a: 55) Ñ this insight
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follows from the (for Lacan clinically demonstrable claim), that the subjectÕs Ôfull
speechÕ (remember the irony referred to earlier) emerges from the interaction be-
tween the subjectÕs discourse, analystÕs discourse, and the Ôthird termÕ or ÔdiscourseÕ
of the unconscious as manifested in memories, parapraxes or slips of the tongue,
and so on. Why is the unconscious, which resembles a language, the discourse of
the other/Other? Because language, with all the societal values, behavioural norms
and taboos embedded in it, pre-exists the individual subjectÕs entry into it (LACAN
1977: 148; LEE 1990: 46; see note 3 in this regard). As pointed out earlier, this entry
implies that one becomes Ôsubject toÕ the laws of society (and of the moral law in
the Kantian sense) through this entry into the symbolic realm.
Bowie (1991: 66-67) highlights what is at stake here, and simultaneously draws
an analogy between LacanÕs psychoanalytical procedure of eliciting Ôfull speechÕ
from the analysand, and the ÔmusicianÕsÕ objective:
Éthe imperious system of Ôthe signifierÕ [i.e. the linguistic system or langue] and the
embeddings and intrications that are to be observed within it, are the speakerÕs unchosen
and unavoidable home terrain. The analysandÕs quest for the ÔfullÕ or ÔtrueÕ speech that
psychoanalysis fosters strictly resembles the poetÕs or the musicianÕs search for origi-
nality and expressive plenitude within the structural constraints that his chosen me-
dium relentlessly exerts.
It will be nothing new to composers and musicologists to learn that they, too,
have to work Ñ constructively and interpretively Ñ within strict tonal (or atonal),
melodic or harmonic limits (whichever of these interlinked terrains they wish to
work in), and that their ÔoriginalityÕ of ÕcompositionÕ depends on the manner in
which they are able to combine and recombine, weave and interweave the musical
and/or linguistic elements that comprise these terrains. For purposes of ideology-
critique it is imperative to realize that, just as the analysandÕs speech is ÔemptyÕ in
so far as it exhibits an alienating attachment to illusory images of unity, coherence
or fullness, the musicologist who believes that she or he perceives in a musical
composition (or in a musicological methodological model of analysis) an example
of perfect, fully transparent unity, marked by self-sufficient closure Ñ without
any connection with or embeddedness in what is the underlying musical equiva-
lent of the unconscious as Ôdiscourse of the OtherÕ (although IÕm not sure what this
would be called15) Ñ would be deluding her- or himself, and runs the risk of being
ideologically trapped in the apparently unified, but in fact ÔemptyÕ realm of LacanÕs
imaginary order. One could be rescued from such entrapment by following a pro-
cedure analogous to the psychoanalytical one of adopting a ÔjeÕ-position in relation
15 In an earlier paper, ÔMusiek en stilteÕ (ÔMusic and silenceÕ; OLIVIER 1983), I argued along
Heideggerian lines, compatible with what I am suggesting here, that one could conceive of an encom-
passing ÔmusicÕ, paradoxically characterized by a (life-giving) silence, as indispensable presupposition
for musical composition. Perhaps that claim could be reformulated in Lacanian terms.
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to the encompassing, transindividual ÔsystemÕ of musical and linguistic possibili-
ties (the Ôdiscourse of the musical OtherÕ, perhaps), in this way resurrecting latent
possibilities of freeing oneÕs musicological practice from potential suffocation by
constricting models. This implies, however, that absolute originality of composi-
tion or musicological interpretation is out of the question, in so far as both com-
posers and musicologists unavoidably have to work within pre-existing systems,
discourses or contexts, but that originality relative to what has historically preceded
the work of individual composers or musicologists is possible. Just as the analysand
discovers, with the help of the interpretive interventions of the analyst, her or his
uniquely individual or ÔoriginalÕ (note the scare quotes) narrative at the level of the
subject (je) of the symbolic register, so the musicologist too, can uncover what is
ideological and what is distinctive about music (compositions or performances) by
ÔreadingÕ it from perspectives opened up by ideology-critical interpretive inter-
ventions.
One should keep in mind that the narrative that the subject is able to con-
struct from the perspective of the je or subject of the symbolic register, working
through her or his free-associating discourse with the analyst,16  is not synony-
mous with what ego-psychologists or phenomenologists would regard as Ôsub-
jective experienceÕ of the ego or moi. For Lacan (1977a: 55) the notion of the Ôsub-
jectÕ goes well beyond what can thus be ÔsubjectivelyÕ experienced, as one may
expect from the insight concerning the transindividual status of the unconscious
as the Ôdiscourse of the OtherÕ. Hence, the life story of the psychoanalytically
actualised subject is equally to be understood as being transindividual, in so far
as the Ôthird termÕ or unconscious, as manifested in all the telling ÔsignsÕ with
which his or her discourse is peppered, enables the analyst to fill in the ÔgapsÕ, in
this way facilitating a ÔcoherentÕ narrative. I have already tried to indicate a pos-
sible manner of articulating an equivalent musicological practice (and will re-
turn to this at a later stage).
Regarding LacanÕs achievement in ÔThe Rome discourseÕ Lee (1990: 47) ob-
serves:
Once again, just as he had in ÔThe Mirror StageÕ, Lacan is standing up to any view of
the human subject based on the Cartesian cogito. The difference in ÔFunction and FieldÕ
is that Lacan has now enriched the je/moi distinction, understanding the je in terms of
symbolic narrative and the moi in terms of imaginary identification. That the human
subject is essentially a place of conflict between the je and the moi, between the sym-
bolic and the imaginary, will remain one of LacanÕs central theses throughout his ca-
reer.
16 It does not have to be an analyst who occupies this position, of course. It could be a friend or
acquaintance who listens to the subject and ÔpunctuatesÕ her or his speech at apposite intervals, thus
Ôfilling in the gapsÕ the way the analyst does. It could also be the person who laughs at oneÕs jokes who
plays this role (LACAN 1977a: 60).
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This remark concerns the conflictual character of the subject which is impor-
tant for the analysis of literature, artworks, or for musicology as the critical under-
standing of musical works, given the differences between manifestations of je- as
opposed to moi-positions in such works Ñ where moi-positions would signify
moments of imaginary (and therefore of ideological) identification, and je-posi-
tions would indicate where gaps or divisions are introduced into the subject as moi
or imaginary construct. Moreover, as Lacan indicates in the following excerpt where
he explains his resistance to any conception of (moi-) totality in the subject Ñ in
Cartesian philosophy or in related ego-psychologies Ñ this is not only true of the
individual subject, but of the Ôcollective subjectÕ (e.g. a cultural community as sup-
posed ÔtotalityÕ) as well (LACAN 1977A: 80; LEE 1990: 74):
Éthis is what leads me to object to any reference to totality in the individual [i.e. the
ego or moi], since it is the subject who introduces division into the individual, as well
as into the collectivity that is his equivalent. Psychoanalysis is properly that which
reveals both the one and the other to be no more than mirages.
Lacan here opens the way for a social theory Ñ or, for that matter, a critical
musicology Ñ aimed at unmasking ideological blindnesses at work behind illu-
sory claims to different kinds of coherence, such as the (complete) structural co-
herence of a musical composition, supposedly unmarred by any significant
destabilizing tensions, ambivalences, ambiguities or Ôtonal indeterminaciesÕ (for
example what Schoenberg christened the Ôvagrant chordÕ, so astutely pointed to
by Nathne Denis as functioning in western music; DENIS 1998: 122-125). These
claims and appeals could also pertain to Ôpatriotic unityÕ in music, film or litera-
ture (typical of what Kurt Vonnegut, in CatÕs Cradle [1965], calls the [illusory] unity
of a ÔgranfalloonÕ like a school, a family, a college, a nation; all of which are puta-
tively totalities that provide the individual subject with a context of identification
where all alienation may [ironically] be overcome).
But for Lacan this is not all there is to be said about the subject, that is, we
cannot understand her or him exhaustively by means of the tension between the
subject as moi at the level  of the imaginary and as je at the level of the symbolic Ñ
there is another register (probably the most decisive of them all as a kind of primus
inter pares), namely, the ÔrealÕ, which has to be invoked to grasp how the human
subject is precariously ÔstretchedÕ among the imaginary, the symbolic and the ÔrealÕ
in a manner that disallows any reduction to either of them (a reduction of which
the varieties of ego-psychology are guilty in different ways). It is not necessary, for
purposes of ideology-critique (and impossible in a mere paper, anyway) to give an
exhaustive account of what is at stake here for Lacan, so a mere sketch will have to
suffice. Lee captures it well (1990: 82):
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The Lacanian subject is the uneasy coexistence of three distinct moments. There is,
first of all, the real Ôpresence that is speaking to youÕ, the speaking body [reminiscent
of KantÕs Ôthing that thinksÕ], the subject of the actual act of enunciation. Secondly,
there is the symbolic subject indicated by the je of the speaking bodyÕs discourse, the
subject of the statement actually uttered. The third moment of the subject, distinct
from both the speaking body and the je, is the imaginary moi constructedÉearly in
childhood to give the subject an identity that it really lacks.
It therefore seems to me that to the subject of the imaginary or the moi, and the
subject of the symbolic or the je, has to be added the subject of the ÔrealÕ as (speak-
ing) body, to be able to understand the Lacanian subject as a subject who (implic-
itly) asks the question: ÔWho or what am I?Õ (LEE 1990: 78). Crucially, and related
to this, what is at stake for the subject to assume her or his role as a responsible,
ethical human being, is her or his ÔdesireÕ in the peculiarly Lacanian sense (remi-
niscent of KantÕs use of the concept in the second Critique and also of HegelÕs in the
Phenomenology of Spirit). ÔDesireÕ here does not mean what is usually meant by it in
the vernacular, which denotes something conscious. The subjectÕs ÔdesireÕ in the
psychoanalytical sense is hidden from him or her in so far as it has always been
repressed, and only manifests itself in those discursive-linguistic peculiarities such
as certain intonations, mumblings, gaps, slips,17  and so on, that provide the ana-
lyst (or another kind of interlocutor) with the means to fill in these gaps and allow
a ÔcoherentÕ narrative to emerge. But more than that: in so far as speech, discourse
or language enables the subject to articulate her or his desire Ñ a desire that is
particular or unique to the subject, although it has to be expressed in the ÔuniversalÕ
medium of (conceptual) language Ñ an unavoidable gap or chasm becomes ap-
parent between the subjectÕs ÔneedÕ and the linguistic form that it ineluctably as-
sumes as a ÔdemandÕ. What one witnesses here is LacanÕs account of the dynamics
of desire, in which the subjectÕs immersion (through her or his embodiment) in the
ÔrealÕ is of paramount importance. He formulates the place of desire as follows
(LACAN 1977e: 263):
Desire is that which is manifested in the interval that demand hollows within itself, in
as much as the subject, in articulating the signifying chain, brings to light the want-to-
17 A graphic demonstration of the revealing operation of such ÔparapraxesÕ was provided by an
ex-South African actress, now living in London, when she was interviewed in South Africa on a return
visit to act in one of the principal roles in a production of ShakespeareÕs MacBeth. After elaborating on
the reasons for emigrating from South Africa Ñ mainly centred around family ties in Britain Ñ the
interviewer asked her what had persuaded her to return for the production in question. The actress
replied that she could not resist the opportunity to return for the sake of playing the part of ÔLady
MacDeathÕ Ñ a slip that she promptly corrected, of course. What the lapse of the tongue on her part
revealed so starkly, was the true (but repressed) reason for her emigration, namely the ubiquitous,
violent crime in South Africa, concentrated in the word ÔMacDeathÕ. Bruce Fink (1995: 3) explains this
phenomenon of linguistic ÔblundersÕ well in terms of the Other as one of the ÔplacesÕ from which Ôdiffer-
ent kinds of talkÕ come.
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be [manque  tre], together with the appeal to receive the complement from the Other,
if the Other, the locus of speech, is also the locus of this want, or lackÉIt is also what is
evoked by any demand beyond the need that is articulated in it, and it is certainly that
of which the subject remains all the more deprived to the extent that the need articu-
lated in the demand is satisfied.
This means that the Other (or the unconscious as discourse of the Other) as
locus of the subjectÕs lack, from which the subject draws when he or she speaks,
cannot ever fill the void signified by demand in so far as it represents the subjectÕs
repeated, but always futile, attempt to articulate its desire (LACAN 1977e: 263):
That which is thus given to the Other to fill, and which is strictly that which it does not
have, since it, too, lacks being, is what is called love, but it is also hate and ignorance.
One may ask why desire canÕt be expressed or embodied in language. If I un-
derstand Lacan correctly here, it is because language, or the unconscious struc-
tured like a language, the Ôdiscourse of the OtherÕ, lacks being in the same sense
that the subject, as soon as he or she enters language, lacks being. For the subject to
acquire language is tantamount to losing the fullness of its being as (ineffable,
ÔorganicÕ body), which is why Lacan refers to this entry into the symbolic as Ôfad-
ingÕ or aphanisis (LEE 1990: 82). Language, as symbolic Ñ as making fleetingly
present in speech (string of signifiers) an absence in abstract, conceptual form (chain
of signifieds), is removed from the ÔrealÕ of the mute body or from ÔnatureÕ Ñ lan-
guage is self-referential. But for that very reason the subjectÕs particular desire as
an embodied being in space and time cannot be adequately captured in her best
attempts to articulate it in the form of a demand: ÔLove me, recognize me as some-
one unique!Õ Ñ there is always a gap between need and demand, and this gap
constitutes desire. This is also why Lacan is in the final analysis not a structuralist
(despite many claims that he cannot escape it), but a poststructuralist. If he finally
claimed that we were/are exhaustively determined or ÔspokenÕ by discourse or
language, he would not escape a deterministic linguistic structuralism. But be-
cause desire marks for him the locus of an unbridgeable chasm between ÔneedÕ (for
example thirst or hunger, or the craving for another personÕs bodily warmth and
the enigmatic comfort it brings), located at the level of the ÔrealÕ, and the expres-
sion of this need in symbolic form as ÔdemandÕ, his position is a poststructuralist
one (in the sense of providing the philosophical means to theorize the subject in an
illuminating manner, but resisting the temptation of claiming, through these, that
the subject can be adequately, that is, conclusively, ÔtotallyÕ theorized or under-
stood in this way).
Small wonder then, that he (LACAN 1977e: 259) describes desire as metonymy
(the substitution of one word for another in the signifying chain), specifically as
Ôthe metonymy of the want-to-beÕ, that is, the ÔconnectionÕ in a Ôword-to-wordÕ
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fashion (LEE 1990: 55), of the subjectÕs essential lack of being Ñ no word adequately
captures this lack because of its being removed, as symbol, from the fullness craved
by the subject. Lee reminds one (1990: 59; LACAN 1977e: 274) that the moi may
thus be understood as Ôthe metonymy of desireÕ, by which Lacan seems to mean
that the spurious, false ÔwholenessÕ and ÔunityÕ of every image with which the sub-
ject identifies stands as ÔpartÕ to the ÔwholeÕ of its repeated, futile attempts Ñ that
is, its desire Ñ to close the distance that separates it from the ÔrealÕ of its (bodily)
being, or from that of the other.
Is it at all difficult, therefore, to see in the never-ending series of alienating,
ideological (and ideologizing, given their false promises of fulfilment) identifica-
tions in the order of the imaginary the endless substitution of one questing image
for and by another, of which it is a metonymic ÔcounterpartÕ? So, for example,
Michael JacksonÕs popular song, ÔBlack or WhiteÕ, especially in its music-video
format, instantiates precisely what LacanÕs claim implies: every successive image
of a racially or ethnically different face is a point of captation or identification for
any viewer who is receptive to the imaginary/ideological claim that Ôit doesnÕt
matter if youÕre black or whiteÕ (which one knows is untrue in extant society; at
best, it ought not to matter). As such it represents the Ômetonymy of desireÕ of the
moi in so far as the ego comes into being at the moment of identification, which, as
demonstrated by the video-images, (symbolic) lyrics and music in question, is
metonymically actualised regardless of the question, which of the rapidly alter-
nating images one identifies with Ñ by metonymic implication, they are all equiva-
lent.
Perhaps the implications of LacanÕs work for a critical musicology may emerge
further (to what has already been said in this regard) here. After all, in music as in
the other arts Ñ literary as well as visual, not to mention multimedia artforms
such as music videos Ñ imaginary positions are intermittently or even more or
less continuously projected for the listening, reading or viewing subject to appro-
priate, or to identify with. Needless to say, these opportunities of identification,
which are located at the level of LacanÕs imaginary register,18  are intimately re-
lated to opportunities of (ideological) identification, and LacanÕs conceptual appa-
ratus therefore enables the critical musicologist or literary critic to analyse musical
performances, literary, film and video-texts with a view to uncovering the opera-
tion of ideology in the guise of imaginary identifications. This could occur with or
without the alternating occurrence, in the text or performance in question, of de-
molishing or subverting instances of ÔstaticÕ or exclusive ideological positioning
(that is, subversions which enable the actualisation of alternating identity posi-
18 Jacqueline Rose (LEE 1990: 204, note 8) has argued that LacanÕs imaginary register as explained
in his account of the Ômirror stageÕ should not be taken as being applicable only to the Ôfield of the
visibleÕ. I agree with her Ñ music is one of the instances where the imaginary register functions power-
fully.
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tions), consonant with the idea of a Ôlife-narrativeÕ on the part of the subject as je,
and appropriated at the level of the symbolic register. And perhaps nowhere more
clearly manifested than in music, there is the inalienable moment of rhythm or
beat,19  which I would argue represents or corresponds to LacanÕs Ôspeaking bodyÕ
or what I have called the Ôsubject of the realÕ. Who can deny the manner in which
music20  moves the body with its rhythms21? In addition to the concepts of the im-
aginary moi and the je or subject of symbolic narrative, this is a powerful tool avail-
able to the musicologist to be able to unmask interpretive claims to unity (puta-
tively in the name of a ÔscientificÕ musicology) as (ideological) delusions, in so far
as rhythm marks the locus of inarticulable desire interrupting symbolic utterances
as demands (for patriotic unity, e.g.) no less than musically inscribed moi-identi-
ties required by these demands.
One could also use musical performance as a model for this relationship of
intermittent identification and emancipation, where the distinguishable, audible
notes or successive sounds are perceivable only fleetingly, as each note makes room
for those which follow in its wake, but always in so far as the listenerÕs memory of
what is past and anticipation of what is to come provide a kind of perceptual Ôma-
trixÕ for meaningful listening (in a manner analogous to HusserlÕs phenomenology
of internal time-consciousness; see STATEN 1985: 51). Taken together, therefore,
19 At the Symposium on Critical Theory and Musicology, held at the University of the Free State,
Bloemfontein, South Africa, in October 2003, Stephanus Muller reminded me that one could make use
of Roland BarthesÕs notion of the ÔgrainÕ of music to encapsulate more effectively what I have in mind
here, because ÔgrainÕ in BarthesÕs sense would include not only rhythm and beat, but also tonality,
volume, intensity and all manner of aural ÔtexturesÕ. It would also be fruitful, I believe, to explore the
consonance between the manner in which the ÔgrainÕ of music affects people, and HeideggerÕs concept
of ÔattunementÕ or ÔmoodnessÕ, as interpreted in musical (or music-reception) terms. See in this regard
OLIVIER 1998a.
20 Music was regarded by Schopenhauer as the embodiment of the blindly self-asserting Ôworld-
willÕ, the source of endless suffering from which art, including music, offered temporary relief (see
OLIVIER 1998; 190-191; especially regarding the significance of the Ôda capoÕ convention in music and
in BeckettÕs Schopenhauerian dramas). Nietzsche accepted this characterization, but without
SchopenhauerÕs pessimistic Ônegation of lifeÕ. Instead, Nietzsche affirmed life, despite the willÕs restless
striving. In The birth of tragedy (1967) Nietzsche identified two principles at work in tragedy, namely the
Dionysian and the Apollonian, of which the former is linked to music, intoxication and excess, and the
latter to reason, proportion and order. Tragedy was, according to him, a combination of the two: the
tragic hero or heroineÕs destruction represented the individualizing Apollonian principle, while the
singing, dancing chorus of satyrs represented the indestructible Dionysian will, that continues una-
bated in all living beings despite the death of individuals. The fact that for Nietzsche, music was the
Dionysian art par excellence, is important in so far as he thus recognized that music addresses humans
directly at the level of the body or the Lacanian ÔrealÕ. It is also telling in this regard that the original title
chosen by Nietzsche for The birth of tragedy in 1872 was The birth of tragedy from the spirit of music Ñ a title
that was later changed (in 1886) as indicated in the list of references.
21 One has to agree with Andrea HurstÕs perceptive observation, at the symposium on critical
theory and musicology, UFS, in October 2003, that rhythm Ñ in so far as it affects the human body
directly Ñ has massive potential for ideological identification via, for example, movement (or ÔfeelingÕ)
in unison, whether in dance or in marching. Essentially, this would amount to imaginary identification
by way of a fantasy-union with a series of sound-images.
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these notes comprise a melody or symphonic development that may be likened to
the ÔnarrativeÕ of a personÕs life-history, while the individual notes represent the
positions of successive, imaginary ego-identifications of the subject.  Modifying
the metaphor somewhat, to the extent that certain musical motifs may function as
auditory loci of identification for listeners Ñ think of SibeliusÕs Finlandia for Ôpatri-
oticÕ identifications of this sort Ñ they may tempt one to adopt a position which is
alienating in so far as it effectively precludes further, or subsequent, positions of
identification with different (perhaps liberating) Ôsound-imagesÕ. To be ÔcaughtÕ in
the web of an identification of this kind at the level of the imaginary is tantamount
to what Lacan describes as being enclosed in the rigid Ôarmour of an alienating
identityÕ. It seems to me that in the case of music videos the potential of such Ôal-
ienatingÕ identification is significantly increased, given the added dimension of
visual images which provide, if anything, an easier locus for such identification.
Needless to say, here LacanÕs work enables the critical musicologist with the means,
at the universalizing level of language, to conduct (emancipatory) analyses of the
ideology-critical sort, perhaps in conjunction with other models such as those of
John Thompson, Habermas, Lyotard (especially by means of his notion of the
ÔfiguralÕ; see OLIVIER 2003a), Johann Visagie or the one specifically devised for
musicology by Martina Viljoen (2002: 32-50).22
Viljoen (2002b) has demonstrated the efficacy of her model in her analysis of
the gospel rap music video, Wrapped up (Ôrapped upÕ), using the theoretical- and
22 In her own, ÔinclusiveÕ Ñ depth-hermeneutical, ideology-critical Ñ model or theory of musical
meaning, Viljoen insists on the need to do justice to both the narrower (intrinsic) sense of meaning and
the broader sense, which involves the social, cultural and linguistic aspects of meaning Ñ that is, the
broad ÔcontextÕ of production and reception Ñ which cannot be neglected in the course of interpreting
the musical ÔtextÕ. The crucial role she attributes to metaphor as heuristic key in both cases is notewor-
thy. Especially striking is ViljoenÕs keen awareness of the ease with which ideological commitments
seep into either of these spheres of meaning, and her determination to use all available resources (pre-
eminently Johann VisagieÕs neo-structuralist Ôideological topography of modernityÕ, especially that part
which deals with figurative meaning) to unmask these, even if they disguise themselves as Ôpure struc-
tureÕ or form. She covers a truly amazing spectrum of relevant research (although unfortunately omit-
ting some pertinent figures, or paying them scant attention), with a view to demonstrating that ÔÉthere
can be no structure without signifying, andÉno signifying without structureÕ (VILJOEN 2002a: 42) Ñ
a formulation that neatly captures the tension on which most theories of meaning (not only regarding
music) usually founder. It is therefore no accident that she focuses on ways to overcome the problem-
atical inside/outside, or text/context divide, and that she points to DerridaÕs notion of the parergon as
being particularly useful in this regard. It is well-known that, as a poststructuralist, Derrida has worked
for more than 30 years to overcome invidious, hierarchical binary oppositions, and his demonstration
that one has to think the ergon (work) and the parergon (supplement or remainder) together, so that, in
the analysis of a text or work one cannot absolutely distinguish between what is outside and what is
inside (i.e. it is ÔundecidableÕ), is no exception. Significantly, Viljoen infers from this that, regarding the
emergence of musical meaning, human interaction should be located precisely here, in the dynamic
tension-field created by the par-ergon. Add to this that what she gleans from VisagieÕs model (itself
indebted to ThompsonÕs), namely the analytical and critical means to address figurative elements of
meaning as well as ideology at both levels (text and context), is given her own modifying twist, and it
should be clear that one has here a significant contribution to international scholarship in a vibrant area
of research.
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figurative-hermeneutic, ideology-critical arsenal at her disposal, showing convinc-
ingly that it represents a highly complex musical text where, through the combina-
tion of music and image-sequences a host of institutional, ideological, religious and
commercial meanings intersect, creating a site where the production of the video in
question, in its turn, ÔproducesÕ a specific type of subjectivity on the part of its recipi-
ents/audience/spectators. Particularly striking Ñ given the traditional formalist
emphasis of musicology (its own type of positivism) Ñ is ViljoenÕs unapologetic
highlighting of (ideological) Ôrelations of dominationÕ operating in Wrapped up, in
addition to which she does not neglect formal musical analysis in relation to other
analytical levels either. The domination that she uncovers in the multimedia text,
namely that of the so-called Ôstar textÕ over the Biblical narrative, does not really
come as a surprise Ñ after all, the rap ÔstarsÕ in question are heir to what Adorno
identified decades ago as the Ôstar principleÕ, which is inseparable from capitalism
in its latest, globalising phase. Her two subsequent meditations (VILJOEN 2002c &
2002d) on the gospel group GRITSÕs They all fall down focus on the figural meaning
of the rap lyrics and the symbolic-existential implications of ÔarchetypalÕ visual pos-
tures in the video text, respectively Ñ both of these being susceptible to the kind of
Lacanian analysis I have proposed here. Here she shows that, far from being irrel-
evant popular/mass art, rap music as instantiated in these music videos fulfils the
important function of ÔmediationÕ regarding urban social roles.23  By adding a Lacanian
vocabulary to her present model of analysis, she could disclose the ÔimaginaryÕ sta-
tus of the dominant image-clusters or -sequences (of ÔarchetypalÕ postures, e.g.), re-
gardless of whether these represent commercial/economic or religious- ideological
interests. Ascertaining the je-positions at the level of the symbolic or linguistic regis-
ter as far as the lyrics are concerned would also yield interesting insights Ñ do these
postmodern subjects remain imprisoned in the Ôalienating armourÕ of their iconic
identifications (with all that this implies for the subjectivities of listeners/viewers),
or are there signs that they are ready to impart to ÔconsumersÕ subject-positions re-
flecting the assumption of responsibility for their own personal ÔnarrativesÕ? Moreo-
ver Ñ as far as the ÔrealÕ is implicated through all those movements, gestures, sounds,
gaps, intonations, and so on, that are inseparable from their embodiment as human
subjects, the perceptive critical-hermeneutic musicologist may discover telling sug-
gestions of the (ethical) desire of these rap artists.
23 It should be added that, with the help of Ricoeur Viljoen (2002c: 4-14) also points to the
transformative potential for Ôre-figuringÕ the human/divine relationship. It is a pity that, in addition to
using RicoeurÕs work on Ônarrative identityÕ Ñ especially given the crucial role he attributes to the
imagination Ñ she has not utilized LacanÕs rich conceptual repertoire here, specifically the tension
between the registers of the imaginary and the symbolic, to come to terms with the functioning of these
popular music video texts regarding the mediation or construction of ÔpostmodernÕ identities. Never-
theless, ViljoenÕs theoretical resources do enable her to demonstrate that They all fall down is a complex
music cum video text in which various musical elements (from a Mozart quotation to ÔAdornianÕ disso-
nance) combine to render a postmodern sense of urbanist spatio-temporality Ñ one that signals hope
(of a postmodern religious variety?) where a scholar like Bauman finds none.
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Sa¾etak
LACAN I KRITI¨KA MUZIKOLOGIJA
PoststrukturalistiŁki psihoanalitiŁki mislilac Jacques Lacan nudi kritiŁkim mu-
zikolozima vrijedne ideje za ideologiju-kritiku. Lacanovi aspekti imaginarnog i simboliŁkog
sna¾na su teorijska sredstva za razumijevanje i demaskiranje skrivenog funkcioniranja
ideologije. Preklapanje ovih sfera omoguæuje kritiŁku interpretaciju funkcioniranja, na
primjer, popularnih glazbenih video uradaka utoliko „to se Lacanovo imaginarno odnosi na
ikoniŁko ili na slikovni aspekt, a ÔsimboliŁkoÕ na stihove tih glazbenih videa. Analiza tih
dvaju aspekata i njihove meðusobne ovisnosti omoguæuje otkrivanje napetosti izmeðu
njihovih odgovarajuæih znaŁenja „to se mogu koristiti u svrhe ideologije-kritike. Imaginarno
u Lacanovu djelu jedan je od triju aspekata ili ÔporedakaÕ u okvirima kojih on shvaæa ljudski
subjekt, dok su druga dva simboliŁko i stvarno. Za Lacana je imaginarno ili sfera slika podruŁje
identifikacije koje je u temeljima razvitka subjektova osjeæaja ÔsebeÕ. Mlado, fiziŁki jo„
nekoordinirano dijete shvaæa u vlastitoj zrcalnoj slici prividno jedinstven i cjelovit gestalt
samoga sebe. Za Lacana je takvo ÔprepoznavanjeÕ vlastite slike kao Ôsama sebeÕ krivo
prepoznavanje. To je takoðer fikcionalni konstrukt koji tvori temelj za daljnji razvitak subjekta
u okvirima identifikacije i otuðenja. Identificirajuæi se sa slikom koja obeæaje puninu i
jedinstvo, subjekt riskira zatvorenost u Ôkruti oklopÕ, funkcioniranje kojeg nagovje„tava i u
toj ranoj fazi funkcioniranje ideolo„kih ograniŁenja kao kasnije faze. Jezik je ono „to spa„ava
subjekt od takve otuðujuæe zatoŁenosti u imaginarnom utoliko „to za subjekt Ôponovno
uspostavljaÕ njegovu istinsku funkciju kao ÔsubjektaÕ u univerzalizirajuæem mediju
simboliŁkog. Razlog za to le¾i u tome „to Ñ u Łinu ula¾enja u simboliŁko (na primjer, biti u
stanju izreæi vlastito ime) „to je, kao Ôdiskurs DrugogaÕ ili nesvjesno, priŁuvi„te aksiolo„ki
(vrijednosno) strukturiranog kulturnog sustava Ñ subjekt dolazi na svoje kao netko s
mjestom u ljudskome dru„tvu. 'tovi„e, simboliŁko podruŁje je aspekt subjekta kao ÔjaÕ (je),
pripovjedaŁ vlastite priŁe, kao suprotstavljenog sebi, egu (moi), ili subjekt zami„ljenih
identifikacija. Meðutim, istodobno to znaŁi da je u drukŁijem smislu subjekt simboliŁkog
otuðen od fiktivne jedinstvenosti koju predstavlja njegova vlastita zrcalna slika. Za Lacana
ljudsko biæe do kraja ¾ivota nesigurno lebdi izmeðu meðusobno neobja„njivog imaginarnog
i simboliŁkog, Łemu on dodaje treæi aspekt Ñ naime, ono ÔstvarnoÕ, podruŁje onog „to se ne
mo¾e izraziti ni simbolizirati kao „to je, na primjer, tijelo u svojem Łistom organskom stanju
i kojem se kao takvome ne mo¾e priæi putem imaginarnog ili simboliŁkog. Drugim rijeŁima,
svaki poku„aj da ga se predstavi je proma„en. No ipak, ÔstvarnoÕ se ne mo¾e ignorirati. Za
Lacana ono je zapleteno u razmaku ili jazu koji odvaja nu¾du koju osjeæamo i simboliŁku ili
lingvistiŁku potrebu, a nikakva artikulacija potrebe ne mo¾e zatvoriti taj jaz koji, prema
Lacanu, tvori ¾elju. Ja ili ego (moi) kao subjekt imaginarnog mo¾e se tako razumjeti kao
Ômetonimija ¾eljeÕ, pod Łime Lacan Łini se podrazumijeva da la¾na, kriva ÔcjelinaÕ i ÔjedinstvoÕ
svake slike, s kojom se subjekt identificira, stoji kao ÔdioÕ ÔcjelineÕ njezinih ponovljenih,
uzaludnih poku„aja Ñ tj. ¾elje Ñ da sklopi razmak „to ga odvaja od ÔstvarnogÕ u njegovu
(tjelesnom) biæu, ili od nekog drugog biæa. Tako, na primjer, popularna pjesma Black and
White (Crno i bijelo) Michaela Jacksona, osobito u obliku glazbenog videa, toŁno oprimjeruje
ono „to implicira Lacanova tvrdnja: svaka sljedeæa slika rasno ili etniŁki drukŁijeg lica toŁka
je identifikacije za svakog gledatelja koji je prijemŁiv za imaginarno, odnosno za ideolo„ku
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tvrdnju da ßnije va¾no jesi li crn ili bijel˙. Implikacije Lacanova djela za kritiŁku muzikologiju
mogu se ovdje i dalje pojavljivati. U glazbi, kao i u drugim umjetnostima, osobito
multimedijalnim umjetniŁkim formama kao „to su glazbeni videi, pozicije imaginarnog
neizostavno su ili Łak manje-vi„e trajno projicirane u subjektovo slu„anje, Łitanje ili gledanje
kako bi se s njime identificirao. Nije ni potrebno isticati da su te prilike za identifikaciju,
koje su smje„tene na razinu Lacanova imaginarnog aspekta, usko povezane s prilikama za
(ideolo„ku) identifikaciju, pa stoga Lacanov pojmovni aparat omoguæuje kritiŁkom
muzikologu ili knji¾evnom kritiŁaru analizirati glazbene izvedbe, te knji¾evne, filmske i
video tekstove s perspektivom otkrivanja ideolo„kog djelovanja pod krinkom imaginarnih
identifikacija.
